Case Study · Dental · New York City

Significant Keyman Risk. Three Buyers.
One $8M Deal.
How a $4M NYC Dental Practice Sold at 7.61× EBITDA.

The selling dentist produced 70% of the practice’s revenue, even with two part-time associates on staff. That concentration scared off most buyers before they made an offer. The three who stayed competed hard, and our client walked away with one of the most remarkable outcomes in New York dental history.

Location

New York City

Gross Revenue

$4M

EBITDA

$1,050,000

Final Sale Price

$8M+

Multiple

7.61×
7.61×
Final EBITDA multiple, rare for a practice with this level of keyman risk
$8M+
Final sale price on $4M gross revenue
$6M+
Cash at close, 75%+ of total deal value
~$1M
Annual post-sale income, seeing patients with no business to run
It was a Tuesday morning at 7:30am when the text came in. A dentist in New York City had received one of our outreach letters. We had been watching the New York City market closely. Buyer activity was increasing, and we knew the right practice in the right location could command an exceptional outcome. This doctor decided to respond.
Within hours we were on a call. Within days, we understood what we were working with.
The practice was generating $4 million in gross revenue. The owner had a strong hygiene department, an exceptional support team, and two part-time associates seeing patients alongside him. But the number that defined everything, the number that would become both the greatest challenge and the greatest opportunity in this transaction, was this: the owner himself was personally producing roughly $2.8 million of that revenue every year.
Two associates on staff, and the owner still driving close to 70% of all production. In the world of dental transactions, that kind of concentration has a name.
The most talented producers create the most complex transactions. The multiple we achieved on this deal is not something most advisors, or most buyers, believed was possible.

Understanding Keyman Risk

What Is Keyman Risk?

Keyman risk exists when one individual is the primary driving force behind a practice's revenue and value. In dentistry, this typically means a single owner whose production, through clinical skill, patient relationships, or specialty expertise, accounts for the majority of what the practice generates, even when other providers are on staff.

The concern for buyers is straightforward: if that person leaves, retires, becomes unable to practice, or simply underperforms post-sale, the value of what they just acquired drops significantly. Without the key person, the practice that produced the revenue no longer exists, and buyers price that risk into their offers. Sometimes they price themselves out of the deal entirely.

Keyman risk is one of the most common reasons strong dental practices leave money on the table, or fail to attract serious buyers at all.

In this case, the keyman risk was undeniable. Even with two part-time associates on staff, roughly 70% of the practice’s gross revenue traced directly back to the owner. When we brought the practice to market, most buyers who reviewed it passed. Not because the practice wasn’t exceptional, it was. But because the concentration of production in one individual made their underwriting uncomfortable.
The groups that stayed were the ones willing to bet on the doctor himself. And that is where the story gets interesting.

Three Very Different Buyers. One Practice.

Not every buyer who passes on a deal is passing for the same reason. And not every buyer who stays is motivated by the same thing. What made this transaction remarkable was that the three groups who engaged seriously represented the full spectrum of the dental buyer market: three completely different organizations, three completely different strategic motivations, all competing for the same practice simultaneously.
Regional Platform
30 to 50 Location DSO

A growing regional group actively expanding their footprint. For a platform of this size, a high-revenue Manhattan practice is a transformational acquisition, and they were willing to compete aggressively to win it.

NYC Density Play
100+ Location DSO with Manhattan Presence

Already established in New York City, this buyer needed this specific practice to deepen their density in a submarket they were actively building out. Geographic fit made them highly motivated, and hard to outbid.

National Platform
One of the Largest DSOs in the Country

Institutional capital, national brand, significant resources. The fact that one of the largest DSOs in the country was at the table for a multi-provider practice with concentrated keyman risk speaks to how the opportunity was positioned.

Three different buyer profiles. Three different reasons to want the practice. All three willing to compete, which is exactly the dynamic that produces exceptional outcomes.
The opening serious offers came in around 6× EBITDA, approximately $6.3M. That would have been a strong outcome for most practices. But with three motivated buyers in the room, we kept pushing.
How the Multiple Moved
StageMultipleImplied Value
Initial serious offers~6×~$6.3M
After competitive process7.61×$8M+
Additional value created+1.6×~$1.7M more

How We Overcame the Keyman Risk

Overcoming keyman risk is never about eliminating it, because you can’t. The owner’s production is the owner’s production. What you can do is create enough buyer confidence that the risk feels manageable relative to the opportunity.
In this transaction, that confidence came from a combination of factors. The practice had a genuinely strong hygiene department that produced independently of the owner’s clinical work. Two associates were already seeing patients, which softened the concentration somewhat. The owner was healthy, committed, and genuinely interested in partnering with the right group, not looking to exit immediately. And the competitive dynamic between three serious buyers created its own momentum: when multiple sophisticated organizations are all trying to win the same deal, each one’s confidence in the opportunity reinforces the others’.
By the time two offers cleared $8 million, the keyman risk conversation had shifted from “why we might not do this deal” to “how do we structure the employment agreement to keep this doctor happy and productive for years.” That is the goal.

When Deal Structure Becomes the Differentiator

The final decision came down to two offers that were remarkably close in total enterprise value, both above $8 million. At that point, the headline price was essentially the same. What separated them was structure.
One offer had significantly more cash at close, meaning the seller would receive a larger portion of the total value immediately at closing, with less held back in earnouts or contingent payments. The other offer was structured with more holdback, a higher proportion of the total value tied to post-close performance targets.
Our client chose the higher cash-at-close offer. The logic was simple: a dollar in hand at closing is worth more than a dollar contingent on future performance targets that the buyer controls post-sale. We helped our client understand that difference clearly, not just the headline numbers, but what each structure actually meant for what would land in their account on day one.
The Final Numbers

EBITDA: $1,050,000 | Multiple: 7.61× | Total deal value: $8M+ | Cash at close: $6M+

A 7.61× multiple on a practice with this level of keyman risk is not a number we see often. It reflects what genuine competition among the right buyers, in the right market, for the right practice, can produce when the process is managed correctly.

What Happened After the Sale

Because the doctor was one of the most productive clinicians the acquiring group had ever partnered with, his post-sale compensation reflected that. Rather than a standard production model, his employment agreement was structured to reflect the exceptional volume he generates.
Post-Sale Income~$1M
Annual income, seeing patients with no business to run

The dentist who spent years building one of the most productive dental practices in New York City now shows up, does the clinical work he has always done, and earns approximately $1 million per year, with none of the administrative burden, business risk, or operational complexity that came with ownership. $6 million in the bank. A million dollars a year in income. A practice he no longer has to run.

The Lesson From This Deal

Keyman risk is real. It scared off most of the buyer market before a single offer was made. But it did not determine the outcome. The process did. By finding three buyers with three different motivations and creating genuine competition among them, we turned a practice that most advisors would have struggled to sell into one of the most remarkable dental transactions in New York City history.

The 7.61× multiple is not something we promise or even expect on every transaction. It reflects a specific practice, a specific market, and a specific competitive dynamic that we engineered deliberately. What we can promise is that you will never know what your practice is worth until a proper process tells you, and that the difference between a proper process and accepting the first offer you receive can be measured in millions of dollars.

If you own a dental practice in New York, or anywhere in the country, and you have been told that keyman risk, practice size, or geography limits what you can achieve, contact us before you accept that conclusion.

Find Out What Your Dental Practice
Is Actually Worth.

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