Every doctor we talk to wants to know the same thing. What’s my practice worth?
It’s a fair question. It’s also one that the internet does a terrible job of answering. You’ll find ranges. You’ll find rules of thumb. Optometry practices sell for somewhere between four and eight times EBITDA. Doctor-to-doctor deals run 60 to 70 percent of revenue. It depends on your market. All of that is technically true. None of it tells you what your practice would actually sell for if you put it on the market today, against the buyers who are actively buying.
So instead of giving you another range, we’re going to do something different. We’re going to walk you through six real optometry transactions we’ve closed, organized by revenue size. Each tier shows two practices in roughly the same revenue range that landed at very different sale prices. Once you see the same revenue produce wildly different outcomes, you stop asking what is my practice worth and start asking the right question, which is what about my practice is actually going to drive what a buyer pays for it.
Every deal below is anonymized. No practice names. No doctor names. The states, revenue figures, and sale prices are real.
These are typically single-location, single-doctor practices. The conventional wisdom is that they don’t trade at premium multiples because they’re too small to attract aggressive PE interest. The conventional wisdom is wrong, and these two deals show exactly why.
Deal One · Tier One
Washington — $1.4M Revenue, Sold for $2.2M
This deal closed at 1.57 times revenue with one buyer at the table. No competitive bidding. No auction dynamic. One buyer, one offer, one negotiation. And the deal moved from an initial offer of $1.9M to a final sale price of $2.2M. That’s a $300,000 increase, driven entirely by how the financials were presented and the EBITDA defended during diligence.
Here’s why this practice commanded that price.
It was a single-doctor practice with one optometrist producing $1.4M in revenue. That’s a high number for a solo OD. Most practices don’t have a doctor who can produce at that level. When a buyer sees $1.4M coming through one chair, it tells them something important. There are excellent systems in place. There’s an outstanding support staff. And there’s a loyal patient base that’s spending real money on premium products and care.
The practice sat in a suburb about 30 minutes outside a major city. Suburbs remain the most desirable footprint for PE buyers across the country. Strong demographics, dependable patient flow, accessible without being saturated. The patient base had disposable income. The practice didn’t take Medicaid. It was a high-end, highly medical practice, meaning a meaningful portion of revenue came from medical optometry like dry eye, glaucoma management, and diabetic eye exams. And it was paired with a strong retail component, where patients purchasing frames and lenses were buying them from the practice instead of walking out with a prescription to fill elsewhere. The selling doctor was disciplined about that retail side too. Appropriate markup, controlled cost of goods, well-run dispensary.
The financials told an even better story. Top-line growing about 5% a year. Occupancy under 5% of revenue, well below the 5 to 6% benchmark for our industry. Payroll managed tightly. EBITDA strong. The owner had built a low-overhead, high-margin operation.
Be cautious about adding doctors to a practice that doesn’t structurally need one. Hiring a full-time associate when the patient demand isn’t there permanently caps the EBITDA per dollar of revenue, and PE buyers price off profitability, not top-line growth. We come back to this point in the next deal.
One more thing about the $300,000 jump from initial offer to close. That money wasn’t manufactured. It was already there in the financials. Defending EBITDA in a PE transaction isn’t about creating numbers that don’t exist. It’s about properly presenting the numbers that do, and then defending them against a buyer whose job is to disqualify add-backs and lower the price. Every dollar of EBITDA gets multiplied at sale. Defending the right number is the lever. On this deal, that lever moved $300,000 with a single buyer in the room. That work doesn’t show up on a P&L. It shows up at closing.
Deal Two · Tier One
Pennsylvania — $1.25M Revenue, Sold for $1.55M
The Pennsylvania practice tells the opposite story.
Rural Pennsylvania, full-time owner working 3 to 3.5 days a week alongside a full-time associate doctor working roughly 5 days a week. Top-line growing. The owner was disciplined operationally. Costs were managed. Staffing was reasonable. The practice ran cleanly.
It closed at $1.55M, up from an initial offer of $1.3M. A $250,000 increase, also driven without competitive pressure. Real value created. But the ceiling on this deal was lower than Washington’s, despite the practice being similar in size and the owner doing nearly everything right operationally.
The reason was structural. The practice was over-doctored.
When a practice with $1.25M in revenue is supporting a full-time associate alongside the owner, the associate’s salary eats directly into EBITDA. Buyers underwrite future profitability based on what the practice will earn going forward. If two doctors are required to produce $1.25M, a meaningful chunk of that revenue is going out the door as associate compensation before it ever reaches the bottom line. The practice’s profitability per dollar of revenue is permanently lower than a single-doctor practice doing the same volume.
This is one of the most common mistakes optometry owners make in the years before a sale. They hire a full-time associate to take work off their plate. To grow the practice. To work less themselves. All of those are valid reasons in their own right. But they come with a cost at sale that most owners don’t see coming until it’s too late to do anything about it. You can defend EBITDA. You can present financials properly. You can drive a buyer up from initial offer to final price. But you cannot manufacture profitability that doesn’t exist in the underlying structure of the practice.
Rural Pennsylvania wasn’t an ideal demographic either. The practice partially offset that with low overhead, similar to a dynamic we’ll see in the Ohio deal in the next tier. But the over-doctoring was the real ceiling here, and no amount of negotiation could change it.
The middle tier shows the largest spread between similarly-sized practices in the entire post. Both are two-location practices with revenue between $1.8M and $2.1M. One sold for 1.17 times revenue. The other sold for nearly 2 times. Same general size, $2 million difference at closing.
Deal Three · Tier Two
Florida — $1.8M Revenue, 2 Locations, Sold for $2.1M
On paper, this deal had everything most owners would assume points to a premium multiple. Boca Raton. High-end demographics. Two well-positioned offices in a wealthy market. Three bidders at the final round. The owner was 100% absent from clinical operations, living in another state and not seeing patients at all. Pure associate-driven model. No Medicaid.
And it sold for $2.1M, the lowest multiple of any deal in this post.
Here’s why that matters to a PE buyer. Retention is a proxy for stability and growth potential. A practice with a 10-year associate has a known, durable production engine. A practice that cycles through associates every two to three years tells the buyer they can’t count on the doctors to stay post-close. Future production becomes uncertain. And uncertainty gets priced into the offer.
Three bidders showed up to the final round. None of them got aggressive. The demographics and the locations weren’t enough to overcome the doctor turnover risk. Top-line revenue was flat, partially as a function of the turnover itself. Production tends to plateau when patients don’t see the same doctor consistently.
EBITDA was reasonable but not strong. Two locations carry significant overhead, and that ate into margin. The practice was well-managed but not exceptional, and the doctor instability capped the multiple even more.
The lesson here is one of the most counterintuitive in the entire industry. An associate-driven practice is only as valuable as the stability of the associates working in it. Owner absence is a positive signal to buyers only when paired with a stable, long-tenured clinical bench. When the doctors are rotating in and out, the absence of the owner becomes a liability rather than an asset.
Deal Four · Tier Two
Ohio — $2.1M Revenue, 2 Locations, Sold for $4.1M
The Ohio practice is the answer to almost every question the Florida deal raised.
This was a family practice. Multiple doctors on staff were family members. They weren’t going anywhere, and the buyer knew it. There were some non-family associates working alongside them, but the core clinical bench was generational. That alone eliminated the single biggest risk that capped the Florida deal.
The practice was located in rural Ohio. Not extreme rural, but outside the suburbs of any major city. Demographics were modest, exactly what you’d expect for a rural market. Income levels lower than urban or suburban metros. And yet, the practice commanded nearly 2 times revenue with one bidder at the table.
Several things drove that outcome. The practice had been in the community for over 50 years. That kind of generational brand recognition is almost impossible to replicate. Patients had been seeing the same family of doctors across multiple generations, with referral networks built over decades.
Operationally, the practice was disciplined in ways that most owners aspire to but few achieve. Occupancy costs were low, the natural advantage of a rural market where commercial real estate is dramatically cheaper than coastal or major-metro footprints. Staffing costs were low for the same reason. PE buyers benchmark staff payroll by geographic market, and rural Ohio supported a much leaner cost structure than a Florida or California operation could.
There was some Medicaid in the mix. Not a drastic amount, but present. In a different deal that might have been a meaningful negative. Here, it was offset by everything else the practice had going for it.
The Tier Two Lesson
The Florida and Ohio comparison overturns three things doctors commonly assume about what drives value.
You don’t need wealthy demographics to get a premium multiple. Operational excellence matters more than zip code. Boca Raton didn’t save the Florida deal. Rural Ohio didn’t kill the Ohio deal.
You don’t need a competitive bidding war. Ohio had one bidder and still got nearly 2 times revenue. The underlying numbers were strong enough that even a single buyer paid up. Bidding wars help when the practice profile is borderline. They’re a multiplier, not a substitute, for fundamentals.
And a little Medicaid won’t kill a deal. What matters is the overall picture, not a single line item in isolation. Ohio had Medicaid and still sold for $4.1M. Florida had no Medicaid and sold for $2.1M.
The deeper lesson is that profitability and stability beat revenue and demographics every time. Profitability tells the buyer what the practice is worth today. Stability tells them what it’s worth in five years. Both factors combined are what drive premium multiples, and why a one-bidder rural deal can outpace a three-bidder coastal deal in a wealthy market.
The top tier shows two practices with nearly identical revenue, similar profitability, both associate-driven, both with two bidders at the final round. The sale prices were $4 million apart.
Deal Five · Tier Three
Massachusetts — ~$5M Revenue, 3 Locations, Sold for $11M+
Three locations in wealthy suburbs outside Boston. Upper middle-class demographics. Patients with disposable income for premium frames, lenses, and concierge-level care. The locations themselves were strong. Street visibility, standalone buildings, real presence in their markets. Not tucked into strip malls or shared-use spaces.
The practice was associate-driven with full doctor coverage at all three locations at all times. The owner wasn’t essential to clinical operations. Top-line revenue was growing year over year. The practice didn’t take Medicaid, which meant it fit nearly every PE buyer’s acquisition model.
And it was highly profitable. Strong EBITDA, driven by all of those factors working together. Premium demographics translating to higher per-patient revenue. Multi-location diversification reducing single-site risk. Stable clinical bench. Consistent growth trajectory.
Two bidders were at the final round. The deal closed at over $11M.
Deal Six · Tier Three
California — ~$5M Revenue, 1 Location, Sold for $7.5M
Same revenue. Similar profitability. Also associate-driven, with the owner not seeing patients at the practice at all. Also two bidders at the final round.
The differences were structural.
This was one massive single location in a lower-income area of South Los Angeles. The patient base had limited discretionary spending, which constrained optical sales of premium frames and lenses, a meaningful piece of total revenue and margin in most optometry practices. The practice took a significant amount of Medicaid, which immediately narrowed the buyer pool. Many PE platforms either won’t underwrite Medicaid-heavy practices at all or apply a meaningful discount when they do.
Top-line revenue was growing, but only marginally. Not the 5 to 10% year-over-year clip that signals a real growth story. More like flat with slight upward drift.
And the practice was capacity-constrained. The single facility was nearly maxed out at its current revenue level. Future growth would require physical expansion, which meant additional capital from the buyer. The real estate did have room for expansion, but at a cost.
Two bidders, same as Massachusetts. The deal closed at $7.5M.
The Tier Three Lesson
Same revenue. Similar profitability. Both associate-driven. Both had two bidders. $4 million difference in sale price.
The variables that drove the spread were structural and market-driven. Where the practices were located. What kind of patient base they served. What kind of payor mix they had. What kind of future a buyer could underwrite.
Three locations in wealthy Boston suburbs with growing top-line revenue, no Medicaid, and patients with disposable income for premium products is the profile of a practice that PE companies will compete aggressively to own. One massive location in a low-income area of South Los Angeles, heavy Medicaid mix, flat growth, and a building that’s already capacity-constrained is the same revenue number on paper but a fundamentally different asset class to a buyer.
You cannot be a multi-doctor practice in wealthy suburbs outside Boston and a single-location practice in a low-income area of South Los Angeles, and expect to sell for the same number. Even with the same revenue. Even with similar profitability. Even with the same number of bidders at the table.
Revenue is the starting point of a valuation conversation, not the conclusion. Two practices at the same revenue can be worth $4 million apart depending on the underlying market, payor mix, growth trajectory, and physical footprint.
What Actually Drives Optometry Practice Valuation
Six deals, three tiers, same revenue ranges, very different outcomes. Here’s what the patterns across all of them tell you.
Profitability beats revenue. Every single tier showed practices in the same revenue range producing wildly different sale prices, and the differentiator was almost always EBITDA, not top-line. Ohio sold for $2 million more than Florida on similar revenue because it was structurally more profitable. Washington outperformed Pennsylvania because a single high-producing doctor with disciplined overhead generates more EBITDA per dollar of revenue than two doctors splitting the same volume.
Stability matters as much as profitability. PE buyers aren’t just paying for last year’s EBITDA. They’re paying for the confidence that the EBITDA will still be there in year three, year five, year seven. The Ohio family practice traded at nearly 2 times revenue with one bidder because the buyer had near-certainty the clinical bench would stay. Florida traded at 1.17 times revenue with three bidders because the doctor turnover signaled instability. Stability commands a premium even in single-bidder negotiations.
Demographics matter, but not the way most owners think. They matter most at the higher revenue tiers, where the difference between premium and discount markets compounds across multiple locations and millions in revenue. They matter much less at the smaller end, where operational discipline and doctor production can make a rural practice outperform a coastal one. Don’t assume your zip code limits or guarantees your outcome.
Payor mix matters. Heavy Medicaid narrows your buyer pool and reduces the multiple. A small amount of Medicaid in an otherwise strong practice doesn’t disqualify you. A practice that’s heavily Medicaid-dependent is a different conversation entirely.
Structural decisions made years before the sale set the ceiling. The over-doctored Pennsylvania practice and the high-producing Washington single-doctor practice are the cleanest illustration of this. Both owners ran disciplined operations. Both deals moved meaningfully through proper EBITDA defense. But the structural decision about doctor coverage, made years earlier, set a ceiling that no amount of negotiation could overcome at sale.
And finally, presentation matters. The Washington deal moved $300,000 from initial offer to close on a single-bidder negotiation. That wasn’t competitive pressure. It was the technical work of defending EBITDA properly so the buyer underwrote the right number. Even with one buyer in the room, how the financials are presented can mean hundreds of thousands of dollars in additional purchase price.
So What Is Your Practice Actually Worth?
Not because you’re not smart. Because optometrists don’t sell practices for a living. You’ll do it once, maybe twice, in your entire career. The buyers across the table from you have done it hundreds of times.
We’ve closed enough optometry transactions across enough states, with enough buyers, in enough revenue tiers, to tell you within a tight range what your practice will sell for if you go to market today. We know which buyers will pay the most for your specific profile. We know where your EBITDA is being underestimated. We know which structural decisions in your practice are helping you and which ones are quietly costing you hundreds of thousands of dollars at sale.
And we’ll show you all of it before we ask you to hire us.
That’s how the first conversation works. You send us your financials. We do a full preliminary analysis. We walk you through how PE buyers will actually value your practice, what the realistic range is, where the leverage points are, and what the most likely outcome looks like in a properly run process. We do all of that work before you sign anything, before you commit to anything, before you pay us a dollar.
If after that conversation you decide you want to sell, we’d be honored to represent you. If you decide you’re not ready, or you want to wait a year, or you want to hire someone else, we wish you well. We’ve never charged a doctor for a preliminary valuation, and we never will. The doctors in this post all started exactly that way.